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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-AIEN" JUROR GROUND FOR NEW TRiAT.-After convic-
tion in a trial for murder in the first degree, the defendant moved for a new
trial after learning that one of the jurors was an alien. N. Y. Const. (1917)
Art. I, sec. I, guarantees a defendant a trial by "judgment of his peers." Held,
that the defendant was entitled to a new trial as the constitutional guarantee
could not be waived by a failure to object upon examination. People v. Bott
(1923, Sup. Ct) 2oi N. Y. Supp. 47.
The instant decision is opposed to the general rule that alienage, though cause
for disqualification upon preliminary examination, is no ground for objection
after verdict. Oskershauser v. State (i9o8) 136 Wis. IlI, 116 N. W. 769;
Kohl v. Lehlback (1895) 16o U. S. 293, 16 Sup. Ct. 384; Fulcher v. State (1903)
82 Miss. 630, 35 So. 17o. However, a few decisions in capital cases support it.
Richards v. Moore (i888) 6o Vt. 449, 15 Atl. iig; Hill v. People (1868) 16
Mich. 351.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-STATUTE PROHIBITING TEACHING FOR-
EIGN LANGUAGES IN SCHOOL-A state statute made it a misdemeanor to teach a
foreign language in public, private, or parochial schools below the eighth grade.
Neb. Laws, 1919, ch. 249. The defendant appealed from a conviction for a
violation of the law. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional as an infringe-
ment of liberty under the fourteenth amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska (1923,
U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 625.
The purpose of the legislature to foster patriotism is held not to justify so
great a restraint on liberty as the present statute involves. See Lawton v. Steele
(1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499; Cummings v. Missouri (1867, U. S.)
4 Wall. 277 (oath of past loyalty for teachers unconstitutional); People v.
American Socialist Society (1922) 202 App. Div. 640, 195 N. Y. Supp. 8oi
(statute forbidding license to schools advocating overthrow of government held
valid) ; Herbert v. School Board (1916) 197 Ala. 617, 73 So. 321 (compulsory
vaccination of pupils held valid) ; (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 833.
CONTEMPT-STRIKE INJUNCTION-VIOLATION BY USE OF ScAB PLAcARD.-During
a strike, an injunction was issued enjoining certain named defendants and "all
persons conspiring or associated with them" from "abusing, intimidating, molest-
ing, annoying, insulting, or interfering with" the men still at work. The defen-
dant's barber shop was so situated that the workmen passed by on the way to
work. He posted in the window a placard saying, "NO SCABS WANTED IN
HERE." Express service of the injunction was made on him and upon his refusal
to remove the placard, he was adjudged guilty of contempt Held, that the
judgment be affirmed. United States v. Taliaferro (1922, W. D. Va.) 290
Fed. 214.
The use of the word "scab," without hint of violence or threat, even when
spoken on the street, has been held not such a disorder as to call for an injunc-
tion. Wood Mowing Co. v. Toohey (1921, Sup. Ct.) 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 95. The court takes the extreme view that the word "scab" is an insult
per se and not merely a term of classification, even though not applied to any
specific individuals. This opinion does not seem warranted. For a discussion
as to the right of jury trial in these cases, see In re Atchison (1922, S. D. Fla.)
284 Fed. 6o4; (1923) 32 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 843.
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EVIDENcE-ADMISSIBILITY OF TAIL OF BLOODHOUNDS.-In a prosecution for
homicide, the trial court admitted evidence that bloodhounds followed a trail
leading to the defendant The defendant was convicted and appealed. Held,
(one judge dissenting) that the judgment should be reversed. State v. Grba
(1923, Iowa) 194 N. W. 25o.
Most of the decided cases in the United States have admitted evidence of this
character, where a proper foundation is laid with respect to purity of breeding
and efficiency of the training of the dogs. McDonald v. State (gio) i65 Ala.
85, 5I So. 629; State v. Adams (i911) 85 Kan. 435, 116 Pac. 6o8; State v. Rasso
(1912) 239 Mo. 535, i44 S. W. 449; i Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec.
177; 3 Chamberlayne, Evidence (1912) sec. 176o; contra: Ruse v. State (1917)
x86 Ind. 237, 1i5 N. E. 778. The hestitation shown in some courts to the use of
this evidence is due to the risks of its misuse by the jury. I Wigmore, op. cit.
supra, sec. 177; see (1915) 9 ILT. L. REv. I9o. It is really a question of whether
such evidence has any probative value and does not involve the constitutional
right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him, as was
suggested in a recent case. State v. Davis (1923, La.) 97 So. 449. The accused
does have an opportunity to confront and cross-examine those witnesses who
give the evidence. See (192) 5 MINN. L. REv. 228; McWhorter, The Blood-
hound as a Witness (1920) 54 Am. L. REv. IO9.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLGENCE OF POLICE OFFIcER-TORT IMMUNITY
OF MuNicrPALiTy.-The plaintiff was injured by a police patrol wagon owned by the
defendant city and negligently driven by a police officer. He brought suit for
damages. Held, that as the city was engaged in a governmental function, it
could not be held liable. Aldrich v. City of Youngstown (1922, Ohio) 140
N. E: 164.
The great weight of authority exempts municipalities from liability for all
acts classed as governmental. 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 537. In the instant case the
Ohio court unfortunately overrules Fowler v. City of Cleveland (igig) ioo Ohio
St. I58, 126 N. E. 72, where it attempted to break away from the unsatisfactory
results of the rule. See COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 911; (1923)
32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 410. See also Board of Education v. McHenry (1922,
Ohio) 14o N. E. 169 (no liability for negligence in pulling a child's tooth); 21
A. L. L 1328, note.
PARTNERSHIP-LIQUIDATION BY SURVIVING PARTNER-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION-
In i916, the plaintiff's testatrix and the defendant became partners in the room-
ing house business. In 1918, the testatrix died, but the defendant continued the
business for more than two years thereafter. Meanwhile, the plaintiff filed a
bill for an accounting. The auditor disallowed the defendant's claim for remu-
neration. The defendant appealed. Held, that the auditor's finding should be
sustained. Leary v. Kelly (923, Pa.) i2o Atl. 817.
The Uniform Partnership Act, which, although law in Pennsylvania, was over-
looked by the court in the instant case, expressly allows remuneration. Sec. 8
(f) ; Pa. Sts. ig2o, sec. 16,613 (f). The rule was otherwise at common law,
in the absence of an express understanding or of the surviving partner having
to continue the business for some time to effect a settlement Gilmore, Partner-
ship (i9ii) 356, 386;, Magullion v. Magee (922) 241 Mass. 36o, 135 N. E. 56o;
contra: Royster v. Johnson (1875) 73 N. C. 474. Or of "extraordinary circum-
stances." Maynard v. Richards (1897) 166 Ill. 466, 46 N. E. 1138 (prosecution
of lawsuit by survivor, resulting in judgment favorable to partnership); cf.
Rutan v. Coolidge (922) 241 Mass. 584, 136 N. E. 257. For a discussion of the
common law, see i7 L. R. A. (N. s.) 399, note; L. R. A. 1917 F, 577, note.
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SALE S-ImPLIED WARRANTY-SALE BY SAmPLE.-The plaintiff offered to sell
"sweepings" to the defendant, and sent a sample, stating, however, that he would
not sell "by sample." The defendant accepted the offer. After receiving part
of the quantity ordered, he refused to receive the rest, on the ground that the
shipments did not conform to the sample. The lower court refused the plaintiff
a recovery for the contract price, and the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the
plaintiff could recover, since the sale was not by "sample." Lockwood, Jr., Inc. v.
Gross & Co., Inc. (1923, Conn.) 122 AUt. 59.
Warranty of correspondence to sample is said by some courts, including the
instant one, to be conditioned on a manifest intention to contract that the bulk
shall correspond. Browning v. McNear (1904) 145 Calif. 272, 78 Pac. 722;
Imperial Portrait Co. v. Bryan (igoo) iii Ga. 99, 36 S. E. 291. By the better
view and under the clear import of sec. 12 of the Sales Act, a representation
reasonably relied on by the buyer is sufficient. Rittenhouse Auto Co. v. Kissner
(1916) 129 Md. 1O2, 98 At. 361; Sharlette v. Lake Placid Co. (1921) 194 App.
Div. 844, 185 N. Y. Supp. 543; Spencer Heater Co. v. Abbott (igi) 91 N. J. L.
594, 104 Atl. 91; Drummond & Sons v. Van Ingen & Co. (1887, H. L.) 12 A. C.
284; Williston, Sales (19o9) see. 252. But where such reliance is considered evi-
dence of a promise, the two views almost coincide. See Browning v. McNear,
supra. The result reached is, however, sound, as the sample was not given as a
representation of the quality of the sweepings to be delivered, but merely as a
loose indication of their probable character. Wood v. Michaud (1896) 63 Minn.
478, 65 N. W. 963; Cox v. Andersen (19o7) 194 Mass. 136, 8o N. E. 236; Smith v.
Coe (1902) 17o N. Y. 162; 63 N. E. 57.
TORTS-INjuRY TO CHATTEL By Dom:EsTic AmIMAL.-The plaintiff put a horse
into a field and later the defendant put a mare in the same field. The mare
broke the horse's leg. No scienter in the defendant was proved. The lower
court applied the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher and found for the plaintiff.
Held, reversing the judgment, that the defendant was not liable. Manton v.
Brocklebank [1923, C. A.] 2 K. B. 212.
The court properly refused to apply the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. -In
the absence of scienter an owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries only
if the animal is trespassing. Mason v. Keeling (699, K. B.) 12 Mod. 332;
Ellis v. Loftus (1874) L. R Io C. P. Io; (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 466.
For limitations of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, see Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. PA. L. REv. 373; Smith, Tort and Absolute
Liability (1917) 30 HARV. L. REv. 409; (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 200.
WiL.s-INTERP-rATIoN-GIFr OF REMAINDER TO LIFE TENANT-r.The testatrix
bequeathed a fund in trust for the benefit of her two daughters for their lives,
or while they remained unmarried, with a gift of the remainder to the children
of the testatrix. A bill was filed. for the construction of the will, Held, -that on
the death of the testatrix the children, including the two daughters, immediately
took a vested interest in the remainder. Redmond v. Gummere (1922, N. J.) i9
AUt. 631.
Unless the testator has otherwise indicated an heir is not excluded from taking
a remainder because he is named as life tenant In re Miller's Estate (1922, Pa.)
118 AtI. 549; (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 575; (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv.
89o; 2o A. L. R. 356, note. In the instant case a gift to either daughter of an
absolute share would interfere with the testatrix's design to limit the enjoyment
of the trust to the period of spinsterhood.
